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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyse the
e¤ects of competition intensity on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated mar-
ket is able to provide a socially optimal quality level. Using a di¤erential-game approach
with price and quality competition on a Hotelling line, we compare the benchmark open-loop
solution against the feedback closed-loop solution, which implies strategic dynamic interac-
tion over time. We nd that steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is (i) increasing
in the degree of competition between rms, (ii) lower than in the open-loop solution, and
(iii) lower than the socially optimal level. In contrast, steady-state quality in the open-loop
solution is at the socially optimal level and independent of competition intensity. Thus, our
analysis identies dynamic strategic interactions between competing rms as an independent
source of ine¢ ciency in quality provision.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, quality is a highly important aspect of the goods or services o¤ered, which
in turn a¤ects the way rms compete. If consumers make their purchasing decisions partly
based on quality, a rm can attract more consumers not only by lowering the price of its
product, but also by increasing its quality. However, since a rms incentive for attracting more
demand by providing higher quality is positively related to the price of the product o¤ered,
price and quality decisions tend to interact in a way that makes the e¤ect of competition on
quality generally ambiguous. It is therefore of theoretical interest to analyse which factors
can potentially determine whether competition has a positive or negative impact on quality
provision.
Whether competition stimulates or sties quality provision is also a question of great interest
for policy makers, particularly in sectors like health care, long-term care, education and child
care, where quality is a key issue. In these industries, prices tend to be regulated in some
countries and unregulated in others.1 There are several issues that are relevant for the question
of whether prices should be regulated or not. One important issue is how free pricing will a¤ect
quality provision, and whether competition along both dimensions (price and quality) will lead
to a socially optimal quality provision or not.
In this paper we revisit the question of how competition a¤ects quality in a dynamic context,
where quality provision requires investments and where quality is treated as a stock that can
be increased over time only if the investment in quality is higher than its deterioration. This
is a highly relevant feature of many dimensions of quality, since increased quality might require
investments in new machinery and additional training of the rms workforce, for example. We
take the dynamic aspect of quality provision into account by developing a model of price and
quality competition within a Hotelling framework, where two horizontally di¤erentiated rms
choose prices and quality investments in each period of an innitely repeated game.
We use a di¤erential-game approach to derive the equilibrium price and quality provision.2
1See Brekke et al. (2014) for a more detailed discussion of price and quality competition in these sectors.
2Price competition in oligopoly models, taking a di¤erential game approach, is studied in Vives (1985), Qiu
(1997), Driskill and McCa¤erty (1989), Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015) among many others.
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Two di¤erent solution concepts are considered, corresponding to two di¤erent assumptions re-
garding the information set available to the players. As a benchmark for comparison, we rst
derive the open-loop solution, where players are assumed to know the initial state (i.e., the initial
quality stocks of the rms) but do not (or cannot) observe the evolution of states over time. This
implies that each player has to decide its optimal dynamic plan at the beginning of the game and
then sticks to it forever. We compare this benchmark with a closed-loop solution, where each
player can observe the dynamic evolution of states and therefore react to changes in the quality
stock of the competitor. More specically, we derive the closed-loop feedback solution, where
the playersdecisions at each point in time depend on the current state (which summarises the
entire history of the game). In contrast to the open-loop benchmark, the closed-loop solution is
strongly time-consistent and implies dynamic strategic interaction between the players.
Our analysis produces three main results. First, steady-state quality in the closed-loop
solution is increasing in the degree of competition, as measured by a reduction in transportation
costs along the Hotelling line. This is in contrast to the open-loop solution, where steady-state
quality does not depend on the degree of competition, as would be the case in an equivalent static
game. Second, we nd that steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop than in the open-loop
solution. The reason is that, in the former case, each rm has an incentive to reduce current
quality investments in order to dampen future price competition. This incentive is absent in the
open-loop solution, where the players do not interact strategically over time. Third and nally,
we nd that quality provision is socially optimal in the open-loop solution, which implies that
the closed-loop solution is characterised by underprovision of quality in steady state.
The second and third of the above-mentioned results have an interesting parallel in the
di¤erence between simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of an equivalent one-shot
game. In a standard symmetric one-shot spatial competition model with price and quality
competition, equilibrium quality is at the socially optimal level if the rms make quality and
price decisions simultaneously, whereas a sequential-move version of the game where the rms
can commit to quality choices before they set prices yields lower, and therefore sub-optimal,
quality provision in equilibrium.3 The mechanism is similar to the one giving rise to di¤erent
3Ma and Burgess (1993) derive this result in the context of a Hotelling model, while Economides (1993) derive
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steady-state quality levels in the open-loop and closed-loop solutions of the dynamic model
analysed in the present paper. Our analysis can therefore be seen as giving additional support
to the sequential-move assumption in one-shot games. Even if price and quality choices are made
simultaneously in each period of the game, dynamic strategic interaction (as in the closed-loop
solution) will create the same type of incentives for underprovision of quality as in a one-shot
game with sequential moves.
Our paper also contributes in a wider sense to the theoretical literature on the relationship
between competition and quality. Theoretically, a higher degree of competition has two coun-
teracting e¤ects on quality provision: (i) more competition increases the incentives to provide
quality for given prices, but (ii) more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which
in turn reduces the incentives for quality provision. Using the transportation cost parameter
as an inverse measure of competition intensity, standard spatial competition models produce a
well-known neutralityresult, where the two aforementioned e¤ects exactly cancel each other
out, and competition intensity has no e¤ect on equilibrium quality provision.4 Brekke et al.
(2010) have shown that this neutrality result is broken in the presence of income e¤ects (where
price changes a¤ect the marginal utility of consumers), which creates a positive relationship be-
tween competition intensity and quality provision. The present analysis identies another factor
which breaks this netrality result, namely dynamic strategic interaction (as in the closed-loop
solution).
The relationship between competition and quality is closely related to the question of whether
an unregulated market will produce a socially optimal quality provision. Our analysis also
contributes towards answering this question. In a seminal paper, Spence (1975) showed that a
monopolist will provide a quality level that is higher (lower) than the socially optimal level if the
marginal valuation of quality is higher (lower) for the marginal than for the average consumer.
In our model the demand system is linear, which implies that the marginal willingness-to-
pay for quality is equal for the marginal and average consumer. In spite of this, steady-state
quality provision is socially sub-optimal in the closed-loop solution. Thus, we show that dynamic
the equivalent result in the context of a Salop model.
4See, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993) for the case of competition on a Hotelling line, and Gravelle (1999) for the
case of competition on a Salop circle.
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strategic interaction between competing rms creates an additional ine¢ ciency that leads to
underprovision of quality.
Our work also relates to studies which employ a di¤erential-games approach. Piga (1998,
2000) analyses oligopolistic markets in which rms set price and advertising levels. Advertising
has some characteristics that are similar to quality, and can be interpreted as a tool to increase
the perceived product quality. However, the way advertising is modelled in these two studies is
distinctly di¤erent from the way quality competition is modelled in the present paper. Impor-
tantly, advertising is modelled as a public good that increases market size. In contrast, quality
investments have a purely business-stealing e¤ect in our model. In Pigas models, the ranking of
desirability of the outcomes depend on the information rule adopted (open-loop vs feedback).5
Cellini et al. (2008) focus on persuasive advertising and compare the outcomes of price and
quantity competition, and reach the conclusion that price competition entails more advertising.
Brekke et al. (2010) provide a model where oligopolistic rms set qualities in the presence
of regulated prices, and constant market size. Quality is also modelled as a stock variable and a
Hotelling framework is used. They show that quality is lower under the closed-loop solution than
under the open-loop solution when the marginal cost of production is increasing. In contrast,
the two solution concepts yield identical quality provision when the marginal cost of production
is constant. In the current study we also nd that quality is lower under the closed-loop solution.
Critically, this result is obtained under a constant marginal cost assumption and is due to the
endogenous price (which is instead regulated in the previous study).6
Siciliani et al. (2013) consider a model with motivated providers and sluggish demand 
which are sensible assumptions in markets in which quality competition is important and prices
are regulated, like health care or education. In these models, the strategic nature of quality
competition depends on the exact assumptions regarding production costs, with di¤erent im-
plications concerning the private and social desirability of outcomes under di¤erent information
5Like in the current study, Piga (1998) applies a Hotelling framework but, di¤erently, market size (and not
quality) is the state variable, which evolves over time according the amount of advertising undertaken by the two
rms. In contrast, Piga (2000) presents a model with price as the state variable, in line with the assumption that
prices are sticky.
6An analogous result is obtained by Brekke et al. (2012) when demand is modelled as sluggish and quality
can be changed instantaneously under a xed price regime.
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rules. The presence of provider motivation induces quality to be higher under the closed-loop
solution when motivation is modelled as providers caring about the total (gross) surplus of the
consumers served by the provider.
Finally, investment in R&D which a¤ects the production cost or product characteristics 
and has some parallels to investment in product quality are studied by Hinloopen (2000, 2003)
and Cellini and Lambertini (2005, 2009), among others. Intensity in R&D, and the incentive
towards cooperative behaviour, depend on the form of market competition (price vs quantity
competition) and the information structure, with a variety of possible outcomes. In general,
more intense competition arises when the rmschoice variable is price (rather than quantity),
leading to higher consumer surplus in steady-state equilibrium (as is well known, even from
static games), and with closed- (rather than open-) loop information structures.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the main
ingredients of the model. In Section 3 we solve the model under the assumption the players use
open-loop decision rules. The open-loop equilibrium is then used as a benchmark for comparison
with the closed-loop solution where the players engage in dynamic strategic interaction which
is analysed in Section 4. The welfare properties of the two solutions are analysed and discussed
in Section 5, before the paper is closed with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Model
Consider a market with two rms located at either end of the unit line S = [0; 1]. On this line
segment there is a uniform distribution of consumers, with total mass normalised to 1. Assuming
unit demand, the utility of a consumer who is located at x 2 S and buys from Firm i, located
at zi 2 f0; 1g, is given by
U (x; zi) = v + kqi    jx  zij   pi; (1)
where v is a positive parameter, qi and pi are the quality and price, respectively, of the good
o¤ered by Firm i, k is a parameter measuring the marginal willingness to pay for quality, and 
is the marginal transportation cost.
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Since the distance between rms is equal to one, the consumer who is indi¤erent between
rm i and rm j is located at xDi , implicitly given by
v   xDi + kqi   pi = v   
 
1  xDi

+ kqj   pj ; (2)
and explicitly given by
xDi =
1
2
+
k (qi   qj)
2
  (pi   pj)
2
; (3)
which is also the demand for Firm i, given the assumptions of (i) uniform consumer distribution
(with mass 1), (ii) exogenous locations of providers, and (iii) full market coverage.
We assume that product quality changes over time, due to investment by rms and depreci-
ation. Dene I(t) as the investment in quality at time t, and  > 0 as the depreciation rate of
the quality stock. Analytically, the law of motion of quality is given by
dqi(t)
dt
:=

qi(t) = Ii(t)  qi(t): (4)
Each rm has a cost function C (), which, at each point in time, depends on the quality invest-
ment, the quality stock, and output. For analytical tractability, the cost function is parame-
terised as follows:
C
 
xDi ; Ii; qi

= cxDi +
1
2
 
I2i + q
2
i

; (5)
where c > 0,  > 0 and  > 0. Thus, we assume constant marginal cost of production, and
increasing and strictly convex costs of quality investments Ii. We also assume that each rms
costs are increasing and convex in the quality stock qi.
Assuming prot-maximising behaviour, the instantaneous objective function of Firm i is
given by
i (t) = (pi(t)  c)xDi (qi (t) ; qj (t) ; pi (t) ; pj (t)) 

2
Ii(t)
2   
2
qi(t)
2; (6)
and, dening  as the (constant, positive) preference discount rate, the objective function of
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Firm i over the innite time horizon is
+1Z
0
i (t) e
 tdt: (7)
In the following we model the behaviour of rms, and nd the corresponding equilibrium,
under two alternative assumptions concerning the information set used by rms at each point
of time. First, we model the open-loop strategy, where each rm sets its optimal plan at the
start of the game, and then sticks to it forever. Under this solution concept, the optimal value
of the choice variables simply depends on time (and the value of state variables at the beginning
of time). The open-loop solution concept requires minimal amount of information; in some
instances, it has been criticised for being too static in nature (Dockner et al., 2000, p. 30);
however, in several circumstances, players behave in such a way, especially when the world is
di¢ cult to observe or the rmsplans are di¢ cult to modify. The open-loop strategy is usually
derived from the solution of a dynamic problem using the Hamiltonian technique. The Nash
equilibrium which is given by the intersection of the plans set by each player is only weakly
time consistent. This is not the case under the feedback closed-loop strategy, where the choice
variables set by players at any instant of time depends on the (current) value of the states. The
feedback strategies are sometimes labelled as Markovian, since only the current values of the
states matter, irrespective of the past history which is reected in the current value of the state
vector. The optimal strategies are commonly derived from the solution of Bellmans equation,
and the Nash equilibrium under the feedback closed-loop strategy is strongly time consistent.
A large body of theoretical and applied analyses compare the strategy and the equilibrium
properties under the two solution concepts. Only in some specic circumstances (see, e.g.,
Mehlman, 1988, Ch. 4; Dockner et al., 2000, Ch. 7) the two solutions coincide. A variety
of outcomes can emerge: while it is impossible, in general, to state which solution concept is
individually preferable for players, and which is socially preferable, it is possible to state that
the feedback closed-loop solution generally entails a larger degree of competition, since players
are able to respond in each point in time to the choice of their opponents.
In these models, it is usual to focus on the steady-state allocation, which can be interpreted
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as the counterpart of the equilibrium outcome of a static game. As shown below, both the
open-loop and the feedback close-loop equilibrium in our model leads the system to a steady
state. Given our standardassumptions concerning technology and demand, it is not surprising
that the (symmetric) steady state we focus on is stable (in the saddle sense) under the open-loop
rule, and it is globally stable under the feedback closed-loop rule.
3 Open-loop solution
Firm is maximisation problem is given by
Maximise
Ii(t); pi(t)
+1Z
0
i (t) e
 tdt; (8)
subject to

qi(t) = Ii(t)  qi(t); (9)

qj(t) = Ij(t)  qj(t); (10)
qi(0) = qi0 > 0; (11)
qj(0) = qj0 > 0: (12)
Let i(t) and j(t) be the current value co-state variables associated with the two state equations.
The current-value Hamiltonian is as follows, where time (t) is omitted to ease notation:
Hi = (pi   c)

1
2
+
k (qi   qj)
2
  pi   pj
2

  
2
I2i  

2
qi
2 F +i (Ii   qi)+j (Ij   qj) : (13)
The solution satises the following conditions: (a) @Hi=@Ii = 0, (b) @Hi=@pi = 0; (c)

i =
i   @Hi=@qi, (d)

qi = @Hi=@i, (e)

j = j   @Hi=@qj . More extensively, we have:
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i = Ii; (14)
1
2
+
k (qi   qj)
2
  pi   pj
2
=
pi   c
2
; (15)

i = i ( + ) + qi  
(pi   c) k
2
; (16)

qi = Ii   qi; (17)

j = ( + )j +
(pi   c) k
2
; (18)
to be considered along with the transversality condition limt!+1 e ti(t)qi(t) = 0:
The second order conditions are satised if the Hamiltonian is concave in the control and
state variables (Léonard and Van Long, 1992). This is the case since (i) HIiIi =   , (ii)
Hpipi =   1 , (iii) Hqiqi =   < 0, (iv) HIiIiHqiqi > (HIiqi)2, where HIiqi = 0, (v) HIiIiHpipi > 0,
and (vi ) HpipiHqiqi > 0:
In the steady state we have

qi = 0, qi = qj = qOL and pi = pj = pOL, implying
OL = IOL; (19)
pOL = c+  ; (20)
0 = OL ( + ) + qOL   k
 
pOL   c
2
; (21)
IOL = qOL; (22)
which gives
pOL = c+  (23)
and
qOL =
k
2 ( ( + ) + )
: (24)
It is straightforward to check that the steady state is locally stable in the saddle sense.7
7 Indeed, suppose to evaluate the dynamic system around the steady state, under the symmetry assumption.
Firstly, note from (15) that

p = 0, so that p(t) = psOL and the dynamic system can be reduced to a two-variable
system, in I and q. In matrix form this can be written as:
10
The results are intuitive. The steady-state price equates the sum of marginal production
and transportation cost, the latter () being a parameter inversely related to the degree of
competition. This result is analogous to the Nash equilibrium of an equivalent static model.
Steady-state investment and quality are also decreasing in the marginal cost of quality () and
investment (), and decreasing in the time preference discount rate (). Notice also that a higher
depreciation rate of quality () is associated with lower steady-state quality, while the e¤ect on
investment can be non-monotonic and depends on the exact parameter conguration.
The most interesting characteristic of the open-loop solution, though, is the independence
between marginal transportation costs and steady-state quality. Applying the standard inter-
pretation of  being an inverse measure of competition intensity, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 When the rms use open-loop decision rules, steady-state quality does not de-
pend on the degree of competition in the market.
All else equal, stronger competition increases the elasticity of (rm-specic) demand with
respect to both price and quality, which leads to lower prices but has two counteracting e¤ects
on quality provision: a positive direct e¤ect and an indirect negative e¤ect, since a lower price
reduces the incentive to increase quality. In standard spatial competition models, in a static
setting, these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other, implying that competition intensity does
not a¤ect equilibrium quality provision.8 Proposition 1 above conrms that this neutrality
result carries over to a dynamic setting, as long as the rms use open-loop decision rules. This
is perhaps not all that surprising, given the somewhat staticnature of the open-loop solution,
where the optimal investment plan is decided once and for all at the outset of the game.
" 
I(t)

q(t)
#
=

( + )
1


 
 
I(t)
q(t)

+
   k
2
0

Clearly, the Jacobian matrix of such a dynamic system has a negative determinant,   ( + )   =; and a
positive trace, ; this means that the steady state is a saddle point. The dynamic properties are the same as in
Brekke et al. (2010).
8See, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993) for the case of Hotelling competition and Gravelle (1999) for the case of
Salop competition.
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4 Closed-loop solution
In this section we present the closed-loop solution, where each rm knows not only the initial
state of the system, but can also observe (and therefore react to) the quality stock of the
competing rm in all subsequent periods. More specically, we present the closed-loop feedback
solution, where the players at each point in time make decisions by taking into account the
current value of states (which summarises the entire past history of the game). While the closed-
loop feedback solution is strongly time-consistent, and therefore arguably a more appealing
solution concept in a context of dynamic competition, this solution is also considerably more
complicated to calculate. In this section we therefore present directly the optimal dynamic
decision rules in the closed-loop feedback solution and relegate the derivation of these rules to
the Appendix.
If the parameters  and/or  are su¢ ciently large relative to k, which we will henceforth
assume is the case, there is a unique globally asymptotically stable closed-loop solution. The
optimal pricing rule for Firm i in this solution is given by
pi (t) := 
CL
i (qi (t) ; qj (t)) = c+  +
k (qi (t)  qj (t))
3
: (25)
At each point in time, there is a positive relationship between the quality stock and the price
charged by each rm. All else equal, higher quality implies higher demand, which makes demand
less price elastic and therefore increases the prot-maximising price. Obviously, an increase in
the competitors quality level has the opposite e¤ect. Since the two rms optimal pricing rules
are symmetric, it follows that
pi (t)  pj (t) = 2k (qi (t)  qj (t))
3
: (26)
Thus, at each point in time, the rm with higher quality charges a higher price.
The optimal quality investment rule for Firm i in the closed-loop solution is
Ii (t) := 
CL (qi (t) ; qj (t)) =
1

(1 + 3qi + 5qj) ; (27)
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where
1 =
k
3 ( ( + )  3) > 0; (28)
3 = s  
r

54

4
p
(y   2g) y + (5y   2g)

< 0; (29)
and
5 =  1
2
r
4
27

y   g  
p
y (y   2g)

< 0; (30)
and where y := 6
 
s2 + 

, s :=  + 12 and g :=
k2
 . The negative sign of 3 is assumed to
ensure global asymptotic stability. For the solution to be real, we must also assume that y  2g.
Finally, given that 3 < 0, the slightly stricter condition y  83g is su¢ cient to ensure that the
solution is unique. In qualitative terms, the conditions 3 < 0 and y  83g are both satised if
 and/or  are su¢ ciently large relative to k.
The key property of the quality investment rule given by (27), is the negative sign of 5,
which implies that quality investments are intertemporal strategic substitutes9; the higher the
quality stock of a given rm, the lower the optimal investment level of the competing rm. The
intuition for this property is related to the interaction between price and quality investment
choices. All else equal, an increase in the quality stock of Firm j leads to reduced demand for
Firm i, and this rm will therefore optimally reduce its price, as shown by (25). However, this
price reduction implies a lower price-cost margin for Firm i, which in turn implies a reduction in
the marginal prot gain of attracting more demand by increasing quality. Firm i will therefore
respond by reducing its quality investments.10
4.1 Steady state
In steady state, where qi = qj , equilibrium prices in the closed-loop solution are given by
pCL = c+  (31)
9As dened by Jun and Vives (2004), intertemporal strategic substitutability implies that the control of each
player responds negatively to the state of the other player.
10 In a static model of price and qualiy competition, Brekke et al. (2015) show that the strategic substitutability
of quality choices holds for more general demand functions, and also holds for the case of variable (output-
dependent) quality costs, as long as the e¤ect of higher quality on marginal production costs is not too strong.
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and are therefore equal to the steady-state prices in the open-loop solution (and to the equilib-
rium prices in an equivalent static game).
Steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is implicitly given by the steady-state condi-
tion Ii = qi, and explicitly given by
qCL =
k
3 ( ( + )  3) (   (3 + 5)) : (32)
In addition to 3 < 0, global asymptotic stability also requires 3 + 5 < 0 and 3   5 < 0.
Notice that, since 5 < 0, the condition 3 < 0 ensures that
3 + 5 = s  
r
y
6
< 0: (33)
How does steady-state quality under feedback rules depend on the degree of competition
(inversely measured by )? Since 3 + 5 does not depend on  , it is relatively straightforward
to see that
@qCL
@
=
@qCL
@3
+
@3
@g
+
@g
@ 
< 0: (34)
Thus:
Proposition 2 When rms adopt feedback (closed-loop) decision rules, steady-state quality is
increasing in the degree of competition.
As previously explained, lower transportation costs have two counteracting e¤ects on the
rmsincentives to invest in quality. For given prices, lower transportation costs make demand
more quality elastic, which increases the prot-gain of quality investments. On the other hand,
lower transportation costs also make demand more price elastic, leading to lower prices, which
in turn dampens incentives for quality investments. In contrast to the open-loop case, where
these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other in steady state, the rst (direct) e¤ect dominates
the second (indirect) e¤ect under dynamic competition with feedback rules, yielding a positive
relationship between competition intensity and quality provision in steady state.
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4.2 Comparison of closed loop and open loop
We have already seen that steady-state prices are equal under both solution concepts. However,
steady-state quality provisions di¤er between the two solution concepts. A comparison (proof
in Appendix) yields the following result:
Proposition 3 Steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop solution than in the open-loop
solution.
This result is perhaps somewhat surprising. Although higher competition intensity leads to
higher steady-state quality levels in the closed-loop solution, as shown in Proposition 2, quality
provision is nevertheless always lower in the arguably more competitivestrategic environment
when the players use (closed-loop) feedback rules than in the open-loop setting.
The intuition behind this result is related to how current quality investments a¤ect future
price competition. Suppose that, at time t, Firm i has a higher quality level than Firm j
(i.e., qi (t) > qj (t)). The optimal pricing rule, given by (25), then dictates that Firm j should
compensatefor the lower quality stock by setting a lower price than Firm i. In other words,
higher quality investments by one rm today will trigger stronger price competition from the
other rm in the future, which all else equal dampens the incentives for quality investments.
Thus, when the rms use feedback decision rules and can, at each point in time, adjust their
investment and price decisions according to the evolution of states, each rm has a strategic
incentive to reduce its quality investments in order to dampen future price competition from the
rival rm.11 This is in contrast to the open-loop solution, where there is no strategic interaction
over time, and where the above-mentioned strategic e¤ect is not present. This explains why
steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop solution than in the open-loop solution.
The result in Proposition 3 and the intuition behind it has a striking parallel in the di¤erence
between simultaneous and sequential decisions in a one-shot version of the game. As shown by
Ma and Burgess (1993), equilibrium quality is lower when quality and price decisions are made
11Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015) present a di¤erential game of oligopoly, in which a similar mechanism is at
work. They consider the case in which rms have to use a renewable productive asset, and show that the decision
on current price taken by a player a¤ects the future incentive of opponents to move their own price: this dynamic
interdependence can lead the Bertrand competition to be less e¢ cient than Cournot competition.
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sequentially rather than simultaneously, and the reason is precisely the strategic incentive to
lower quality in order to dampen price competition when quality decisions are made before
prices are set.12 This suggests that, in the case at hand, simultaneous-move and sequential-
move games in a static setting provide results which are reasonable parallels of the open-loop
and the closed-loop solutions, respectively, in a dynamic setting.
5 Welfare
We dene social welfare as the discounted present value of the sum of aggregate consumer
surplus and prots accruing over the innite time horizon. Since total demand is xed, this is
equivalent to aggregate gross consumer utility minus the total costs of production, transportation
and quality provision.13 We derive the rst-best optimal solution by letting the social planner
choose the quality investment and market share for each rm, in order to maximise social welfare.
Formally, this problem is given by
Maximise
Ii(t); Ij(t); xDi (t)
W =
+1Z
0
266664
xDi (t)Z
0
(v   x+ kqi(t)) dx+
1Z
xDi (t)
(v    (1  x) + kqj(t)) dx
 c  2 Ii(t)2   2 qi(t)2   2 Ij(t)2   2 qj(t)2
377775 e tdt;
(35)
subject to

qi(t) = Ii(t)  qi(t); (36)

qj(t) = Ij(t)  qj(t); (37)
qi(0) = qi0 > 0; (38)
qj(0) = qj0 > 0; (39)
12Notice that the strategy of reducing quality in order to dampen price competition does not succeed in
equilibrium, in the sense that steady-state prices in the closed-loop solution are identical to the ones on the
open-loop solution. This is also true for the equivalent simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of the
one-shot game. The reason is of course the symmetric nature of the game, where the e¤ects of unilateral quality
reductions on prices are cancelled out in equilibrium, since both rms face exactly the same incentives.
13Notice that social welfare does not depend directly on prices, which are here just instruments of surplus
distribution between rms and consumers, with no e¢ ciency losses involved.
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which simplies to
Maximise
Ii(t); Ij(t); xDi (t)
W =
+1Z
0
264 v   c  2 + kqi(t)xDi (t) + kqj(t)  1  xDi (t)
 2 Ii(t)2   2 qi(t)2   2 Ij(t)2   2 qj(t)2
375 e tdt; (40)
subject to (36)-(39).
Let i(t) and j(t) be the current value co-state variables associated with the two state
equations. The current-value Hamiltonian is:
H = v c  
2
+kqix
D
i +kqj
 
1  xDi
  
2
 
I2i + Ij
2
  
2
 
qi
2 + qj
2

+i (Ii   qi)+j (Ij   qj) :
(41)
The solution is given by (a) @H=@Ii = 0 , (b) @H=@Ij = 0, (c) @H=@xDi = 0, (d)

i =
i   @H=@qi, (e)

j = j   @H=@qj , (f)

qi = @Hi=@i, (h)

qj = @H=@j , or more extensively,
i = Ii; (42)
j = Ij ; (43)
k (qi   qj) = 0; (44)

i = (+ )i + qi   kxDi ; (45)

j = (+ )j + qj   k(1  xDi ); (46)

qi = Ii   qi; (47)

qj = Ij   qj : (48)
In the symmetric steady state we have:  = I, (+ ) + q   k2 = 0 and q = I

 , which
gives
q =
k
2 ( (+ ) + )
= qOL: (49)
Therefore, steady-state quality under open-loop decision rules coincides with the rst-best
steady-state quality level. Considering the result in Proposition 3, the following result follows
immediately:
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Proposition 4 Compared with the rst-best optimal level, quality is optimally provided in the
open-loop solution and is underprovided in the closed-loop solution.
The welfare-optimal quality provision in the open-loop solution is partly explained by the
linearity of the demand system, which implies that consumersmarginal and average valuations
of quality are identical. As demonstrated by Spence (1975) in a monopoly setting, whether
quality is over- or under-provided depends on the di¤erence between marginal and average
willingness-to-pay for quality. However, dynamic strategic interaction (with feedback decision
rules) creates an ine¢ ciency that leads to underprovision of quality in the closed-loop solution.14
The welfare properties of the open-loop and closed-loop solutions mimic the welfare proper-
ties of the Hotelling model with price and quality competition in a one-shot game, where quality
is optimally provided with simultaneous decision making, whereas sequential quality and price
decisions imply an underprovision of quality in equilibrium (as shown by Ma and Burgess, 1993).
This should come as no great surprise, since we have already established the equivalence be-
tween open-loop and closed-loop in a dynamic setting and, respectively, the simultaneous-move
and sequential-move versions of the one-shot game. In fact, the properties of the open-loop
steady-state solution and the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move static game are vir-
tually identical, including the welfare properties, as indicated by the fact that equilibrium (or
steady-state) quality is independent of transportation costs in both cases.
However, a relevant di¤erence occurs between the steady-state quality in the closed-loop
solution and the equilibrium quality in the sequential-move one-shot game. Indeed, the quality
in the closed-loop dynamic game depends on transportation cost, while equilibrium quality in
the sequential-move game does not. Put di¤erently, the neutralityresult obtained by static
games, according to which lower transportation cost (and hence ercer competition) has no
e¤ect on quality, no longer holds if we consider dynamic competition.
14The fact that time, and more specically competition over time, can be a source of ine¢ cient equilibria is
well known in di¤erent contexts; for instance, Cellini and Lambertini (1998) show that accumulation of capital
over time could be a source of ine¢ cient market allocation in a di¤erential game framework. Again, Araujo and
Guimaraes (2015) show that time can be a source of ine¢ ciency in an oligopoly market for the presence of delay
options.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the behaviour of oligopolistic rms, when they can choose the
price and the quality of their products. Quality competition in oligopolistic markets is the
object of a large body of theoretical and applied literature. The novelty of the present analysis
rests on two facts: rstly, we have made the price endogenous, while most available models
generally consider prices as regulated when quality is the choice variable (see, e.g., Siciliani et
al., 2013). Second, we have taken a di¤erential-game approach, which allows us to highlight how
price and quality choices interact when rms make their decisions in a dynamic framework. More
specically, we have presented a di¤erential-game model, under di¤erent assumptions concerning
the information set used by rms over time, namely, the open-loop rule and the feedback closed-
loop rule. The properties of the equilibria generated under these two assumptions are studied
and compared with the conclusions provided by static models of price and quality competition
(e.g., Ma and Burgess, 1993).
Our model highlights the e¤ect of current quality on rivalsfuture price decisions, which is
shown to play a crucial role in rmsdecision making. In particular, steady-state quality emerges
to be socially sub-optimal if the closed-loop information rule is used by the competing rms.
This is due to the interaction between price and quality in a dynamic setting. Thus, we show
that dynamic strategic interaction between competing rms creates an additional ine¢ ciency
that leads to underprovision of quality. We have also shown that the steady-state quality in
the closed-loop solution is increasing in the degree of competition, as measured by a reduction
in transportation costs. This is in contrast to the outcome from an equivalent static game and
from the open-loop solution, where the equilibrium quality does not depend on the degree of
competition.
In sum, the dynamic approach allows us to uncover relevant and non-trivial e¤ects, both
from a positive and a normative point of view. Since quality is generally non-veriable and
thus hard to regulate, and since the under-provision result is caused by dynamic interaction
between price and quality choices, our analysis suggests a potential role for price regulation as
an instrument that can be used to avoid an ine¢ cient outcome with respect to quality provision.
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Our analysis also shows that such a policy intervention might be unnecessary if rms instead are
committed to long-term plans regarding quality investments (in which case the relevant solution
concept is open-loop). The consideration of time, hence, simply represents an additional source of
evaluation in the never-ending debate about the necessity and desirability of public intervention
in market economies.
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Appendix
Derivation of the closed-loop solution
The rms instantaneous objective function is
(pi   c)

1
2
+
k (qi   qj)
2
  pi   pj
2

  
2
I2i  

2
qi
2   F (A1)
which  faced with the linear dynamic constraint  gives rise to a linear-quadratic problem.
Hence, we dene the value function as
V i(qi; qj) = 0 + 1qi + 2qj + (3=2)q
2
i + (4=2)q
2
j + 5qiqj : (A2)
Dene Ii = i(qi; qj) and Ij = j(qi; qj). The value function has to satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation:
V i(qi; qj) = max
8><>: (pi   c)

1
2 +
k(qi qj)
2  
pi pj
2

  2 I2i   2 qi2   F
+V iqi(qi; qj) (Ii   qi) + V iqj (qi; qj) (Ij   qj)
9>=>; : (A3)
Maximisation of the right-hand-side with respect to Ii yields V iqi = Ii, which after substitution
gives
Ii = i(qi; qj) =
1 + 3qi + 5qj

: (A4)
Similarly, we obtain
Ij = j(qi; qj) =
1 + 3qj + 5qi

: (A5)
Maximisation of the right-hand-side with respect to pi and pj yields
1
2
+
k (qi   qj)
2
  pi   pj
2
  (pi   c) 1
2
= 0; (A6)
1
2
+
k (qj   qi)
2
  pj   pi
2
  (pj   c) 1
2
= 0;
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from which we obtain the simple expression:
pi = i(qi; qj) = c+  +
k (qi   qj)
3
pj = j(qi; qj) = c+    k (qi   qj)
3
(A7)
pi   pj = 2k (qi   qj)
3
Substituting Ii = i(qi; qj), Ij = j(qi; qj), V
i
qi(qi; qj) = 1+3qi+5qj , V
i
qj = 2+4qj +5qi
into the HJB equation, we obtain
V i(qi; qj) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

 +
k(qi qj)
3

1
2 +
k(qi qj)
6

  12 (1 + 3qi + 5qj)2   2 qi2   F
+(1 + 3qi + 5qj)

1+3qi+5qj
   qi

+(2 + 4qj + 5qi)

1+3qj+5qi
   qj

9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
; (A8)
and, after substitution of V i, we obtain

0   1
2
   1
2
21  
1

12

+qi

1 ( + )  1
3
k   1

13   1

25   1

15

+qj

2 ( + ) +
1
3
k   1

23   1

14   1

15

(A9)
+q2i

3

 +
1
2


  1
2
23  
1

25 +
1
2
   1
18
k2


+q2j

4

 +
1
2


  1

34   1
2
25  
1
18
k2


+qiqj

(2 + )5 +
1
9
k2

  2

35   1

45

For the equality to hold, the terms in brackets in the above equation have to be equal to zero.
Notice that the last three terms do not depend on 0, 1 and 2, but only on 3, 4 and 5.
We therefore focus on the following system of three equations in three unknowns (3, 4 and
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5):
3

 +
1
2


  1
2
23  
1

25 +
1
2
   1
18
k2

= 0;
4

 +
1
2


  1

34   1
2
25  
1
18
k2

= 0; (A10)
5 (2 + ) +
1
9
k2

  2

35   1

45 = 0:
Dene g := k
2
 and s :=
 
 + 12

. We can re-write the system more succinctly as:
s3   1
2
23  
1

25 +
1
2
   1
18
g = 0;
s4   1

34   1
2
25  
1
18
g = 0; (A11)
2s5 +
1
9
g   2

35   1

45 = 0:
Dene
A : =
s


3
2
y   g

> 0;
B : =
1
6
y
2
  g

y > 0; (A12)
C : =
4
27

y   g   2
p
3B

> 0;
E : =
4
27

y   g + 2
p
3B

> 0;
where y := 6
 
s2 + 

, and where the condition y > 2g ensures that these parameters (and
therefore the possible solutions) are real. The positive sign of C is conrmed by noticing that
y   g > 2
p
3B , (y   g)2 >
 
2
s
3

1
6
y
2
  g

y
!2
; (A13)
which always holds since
(y   g)2  
 
2
s
3

1
6
y
2
  g

y
!2
= g2 > 0: (A14)
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There are six possible solutions to (A11), given by:
3 = s   1
9
A; 4 =
2 (6y + 5g)
9 (6y   4g)A; 5 =
2
9
A (S1)
3 = s +
1
9
A; 4 =  2 (6y + 5g)
9 (6y   4g)A; 5 =  
2
9
A (S2)
3 = s  

6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
C
p
C;4 =
1
2
p
C;5 =  1
2
p
C (S3)
3 = s +

6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
C
p
C;4 =  1
2
p
C;5 =
1
2
p
C (S4)
3 = s  

6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
E
p
E;4 =
1
2
p
E;5 =  1
2
p
E (S5)
3 = s +

6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
E
p
E;4 =  1
2
p
E;5 =
1
2
p
E (S6)
Global asymptotic stability requires 3 < 0, 3+5 < 0 and 3 5 < 0. We can immediately
eliminate (S2) because 3 > 0. The same is true for (S1), since 3+5 = s+ 19A > 0. Regarding
(S4), notice that a su¢ cient condition for 3 > 0 is
6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
C =
1
4g

3y   2g + 6
p
3B

> 0; (A15)
which always holds for y > 2g. Similarly, regarding (S6), a su¢ cient condition for 3 > 0 is
6y   5g
4g
  81
16g
E =
1
4g

3y   2g   6
p
3B

> 0; (A16)
which always holds since
(3y   2g)2  

6
p
3B
2
= 2g (2g + 3y) > 0: (A17)
Thus, (S4) and (S6) can also be ruled out because 3 > 0. In the two remaining solutions (S3)
and (S5) we have 5 < 0, implying that 3 + 5 < 3 < 3   5. For these two solutions, the
conditions for global asymptotic stability therefore reduce to 3   5 < 0. For (S5) we have
3   5 = s  

6y   7g   81
4
E
 p
E
4g
; (A18)
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where
6y   7g   81
4
E = 3y   4g   6
p
3B: (A19)
A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for 3   5 < 0 is
(3y   4g)2  

6
p
3B
2
=  2g (3y   8g) < 0; (A20)
which is violated for y > 83g. Thus, the condition y >
8
3g is su¢ cient to rule out (S5).
Finally, for the only solution left, (S3), we have
3   5 = s  

6y   7g   81
4
C
 p
C
4g
: (A21)
A necessary condition for 3   5 < 0 is therefore
6y   7g   81
4
C = 3y   4g + 6
p
3B > 0; (A22)
which holds for all y > 2g. It is straightforward to show that the second term in (A21) is
monotonically increasing in y and decreasing in g (for y > 2g). Since y is monotonically increas-
ing in  and g is monotonically decreasing in k and  , and since the rst term in (A21) does
not depend on either of these parameters, if follows that (S3) satises the conditions for global
asymptotic stability if  and/or  are su¢ ciently large relative to k. In qualitative terms, this
condition ( and/or  su¢ ciently large relative to k) also ensures y > 83g, which implies that
(S3) is the unique globally asymptotically stable closed-loop solution.
In the steady state closed-loop solution we have
Ii =
1 + 3qi + 5qj

;
Ii = qi; (A23)
qCL =
1
   3   5 ;
where 3 and 5 are given by (S3). From the second and third line in (A9) we can dene the
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following system of two equations in 1 and 2:
1 ( + )  k
3
  13

  25

  15

= 0; (A24)
2 ( + ) +
k
3
  23

  14

  15

= 0:
Solving this system yields the following solution for 1:
1 =
k (3 + 5   ( + ) )
3
 
( + ) (23 + 5   ( + ) 2)  23 + 25   35 + 45
 : (A25)
From (S3), note that 4 =  5. We can therefore re-write 1 as
1 =
k (3 + 5   ( + ) )
3 (( ( + ) ((23 + 5)  ( + ) ))  3 (5 + 3)) =
k
3 ( ( + )  3) ; (A26)
so that
qCL =
1
   3   5 =
k
3 ( ( + )  3) (   3   5) : (A27)
Proof of Proposition 2
The closed-loop solution requires g  y2 . Since g is monotonically decreasing in  while y does
not depend on  , this implies that the closed-loop solution exists for su¢ ciently high values of
 . At the lower limit of  , implicitly given by y = 2g, steady-state quality in the closed-loop
solution is
qCL

y=2g
=
k
2k2
3   
2
2

+ 4
r
2

2k2
3   
2
2

+ ()2   
 ; (A28)
whereas steady-state quality in the open-loop solution is
qOL

y=2g
=
k
2k2
3   
2
2
: (A29)
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A straightforward comparison of (A28) and (A29) shows that qOL

y=2g
> qCL

y=2g
if
s
2

2k2
3
  
2
2

+ ()2    > 0; (A30)
or, equivalently, s
2k
qOLjy=2g
+ ()2    > 0; (A31)
which always holds. Since qOL is independent of  while qCL is monotonically decreasing in  ,
it follows that qOL > qCL for all g  y2 . Q.E.D.
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